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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).

STAT]EME;^fTQFKSUPS
The determinative issue(s) in this case is whether the trial court erred in determining that
there were no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Because Appellant
believes that the trial court erred in several particulars, Appellant states the issues as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to whether the parties reached an
agreement.
2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the alleged terms of the alleged
agreement between the parties.
3. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the purpose that funds were deposited
in escrow.
4. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the "Formalization Agreement" and
the repudiation of the alleged agreement.

1

5. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the "Confirmation Memo."
6. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the escrow instructions.
7. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to whether the acts of the parties
demonstrated the existence of an enforceable agreement between the parties.
8. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the trial court's conclusion that the
form and effect of the "Formalization Agreement" was not material to Appellee's claim.
9. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment with respect to whether there was actually a meeting
of the minds or mutual assent of the parties.
10. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment when it determined that if there was an agreement
entered into between the parties, such agreement was not repudiated by a separate agreement
reached between the parties on the following day.
11. Whether the trial court erred in determining that there were no genuine issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment when it concluded that there was no basis for
2

estopping Appellee from enforcing the "Conformation Memo" and that both parties should instead
be estopped from denying the existence of the alleged agreement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court is called upon in this appeal to review the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in a number of particulars. Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773
P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). This Court accords "no deference to the trial court's conclusion
that the facts are not in dispute nor the court's legal conclusions based on those facts." Kitchen
v. Col. Gas Co., Inc., 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (1992).l
Additionally, this Court "review[s] all relevant facts, including all inferences arising from those
facts, in a light most favorable to the losing party." Id. This has been interpreted to mean that
this Court must accept Appellant's facts as set forth before the trial court and in sworn testimony
and they determine whether the facts create genuine issues of material fact. See, e.g., Beehive
Brick Co. V. Robinson Brick Co. 780 P.2d 827 (Utah App. 1989). Under applicable standards
of review, this Court must resolve all doubts in favor of Appellant. Draper Bank & Trust Co. v.
Lawson, 675 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1983). "If, after a review of the record, it appears that there is a
1

Said another way, because this Court resolves only legal issues when reviewing a grant
of summary judgment, it does not defer to the trial court's ruling in any particular. Ferree v.
State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989).
3

material factual issue, [this Court is] compelled to reverse the trial court's grant of summary
judgment." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. V. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989). "One sworn
statement under oath [involving a material fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual
issue, thereby precluding the entry of summary judgment." Id. With respect to this Court's
handling of its review of the facts in an appeal from a summary judgment motion, it is improper
for the trial court or this Court on appeal to weigh the evidence or assess its credibility or make
any determination about the opposing party's ultimate chance of prevailing in a trial on the merits.
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984);
accord Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah App. 1988).2
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Appellant is unaware of any statutes that are determinative in this action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case involves a dispute between Appellant and Appellee as to whether they actually
entered into an agreement and, if so, what the terms of the agreement actually are. Appellee

2

In White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court addressed
this issue and cast some dispersions on whether the party opposing summary judgment and
appealing the grant of summary judgment could actually prevail in a trial on the merits. The Court
noted, however, that such consideration at the appellate level was not appropriate. The Court was
obligated to resolve all doubts in that party's favor regardless of how the Court felt about that party's
ability to ultimately succeed at trial.
4

maintains that the parties reached a binding agreement. Appellant, on the other hand, maintains
that the parties did not reach an agreement, but instead only participated in preliminary
discussions and negotiations. In short, that there was no meeting of the minds or mutual assent.
Appellant further maintains that even if it can be argued that the parties reached an agreement,
the parties have not agreed to numerous and material terms and conditions thereof. As a result,
Appellant maintains that there were numerous genuine issues of material fact both with respect
to whether the parties actually entered into an agreement and the terms and conditions of any
alleged agreement.
Course of the Proceedings
Appellant was a general contractor on a large industrial project in Beaver County, Utah.
Appellee was hired by a sub-contractor to perform certain tasks and supply certain material on the
project. The sub-contractor failed to pay Appellee for its services on the project. Appellee
threatened to file a mechanic's lien on the project. Appellant entered into discussions and
negotiations with Appellee with the goal of avoiding the filing of a mechanic's lien. As part of
the negotiations, Appellant escrowed a significant amount of money as a show of good faith and
which Appellee could access if efforts failed to force the sub-contractor to pay the money owing
to Appellee.
Appellee apparently believed that it had entered into an agreement with Appellant. When
Appellee deemed that Appellant had not performed under the alleged agreement, Appellee filed
5

a Complaint for Breach of Contract against Appellee. Shortly thereafter, Appellee filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment on the issue of whether a legally enforceable agreement existed between
the parties. Appellant both answered the Complaint and opposed the Motion for Summary
Judgment. Judge J. Philip Eves in the Fifth District in and for Beaver County granted Appellee's
Motion for Summary Judgment and held that an enforceable agreement did exist between the
parties.
Disposition of the Trial Court
Judge J. Philip Eves in the Fifth District in and for Beaver County granted Appellee's
Motion for Summary Judgment and held that an enforceable agreement did exist between the
parties. Because it is a summary judgment action, inherent in the trial court's ruling is the
conclusion that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the parties
actually entered into an alleged agreement or with respect to the terms of the alleged agreement
itself. As shown below, there were numerous genuine issues of material fact and the trial court
erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For illustrative purposes, because this is an appeal from a summary judgment and because
this Court gives no deference to the trial court in this context, Appellant states the facts as
follows:
1. Facts as set forth in the trial court by Appellant; and

6

2. Statement of Material Facts in Dispute Before the Trial Court.
Facts Set Forth by Appellant
The following factual statements are taken from Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. (Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (R. 57-82), attached hereto as Exhibit A).
1. Appellant is a general contractor on a construction project in Beaver County, Utah,
owned and operated by Circle Four Farms (the "Project"). (Appellant's Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p.4, (R. 60)).
2. Appellee provided concrete work on the Project at the request of Precise Concrete, a
subcontractor on the Project. (Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment, p.4, (R. 60)).
3.

Precise failed to pay Appellee for work and supplies provided on the Project.

(Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p.4, (R.
60)).
4. Discussions and negotiations were held between Appellee and Appellant regarding the
nonpayment by Precise. Due to a pendingfinancialtransaction, Circle Four and Appellant wanted
to avoid the filing of a mechanic's lien upon the Project.

(Appellant's Memorandum in

Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p.4, (R. 60)).

7

5.

In order to avoid the filing of a the mechanic's lien, the parties discussed an

arrangement whereby certain funds would be escrowed by Appellant on certain conditions.
(Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, p.4, (R.
60); see also Affidavit of Terry Weaver, at \\ 5-7, (R. 93), attached hereto as Exhibit B).
6. The discussions regarding the terms of such an arrangement began between Mr. Wayne
Smith, acting for Appellee, and Mr. Terry Weaver, acting for Appellant. Mr. Weaver and Mr.
Smith discussed the various points to be included in any such agreement by telephone on or about
November 6, 1995. The discussions between Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith were followed by a
confirmation memo sent to Mr. Smith by Mr. Weaver on November 7. (Affidavit of Weaver, at
Vf 7-8, (R. 92-93); Confirmation Memo (R. 72), attached hereto as Exhibit D).
7. On the following day, November 8, 1995, Mr. Smith contacted Mr. Solt, Chief
Financial Officer of Appellant. Mr. Smith supplied Mr. Solt, by fax, with proposed escrow
instructions, and with a proposed agreement (the "Formalization Agreement") prepared by
Western's attorney, presumable to carry into effect the discussions held the day before. (Affidavit
of Ronald Solt, (R. 89-91), attached as Exhibit C; Formalization Agreement (R. 73-78), attached
hereto as Exhibit E).
8. In the conversation on November 8, 1995, Mr. Smith advised Mr. Solt that Appellant
was required to sign the Formalization Agreement and the Escrow Agreement and deposit the
funds that day, or Western Rock would file its lien. (Affidavit of Solt, at \ 4. (R. 62)).
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9. The Formalization Agreement contained additional terms which were not included in
the prior discussions of the parties, and which were not included in the memo of November 7,
1995, or terms different than those in the discussions and the Confirmation Memo. The applicable
paragraphs, with the additional and different terms highlighted, all of which are substantial and
material, are quoted from the Formalization Agreement as follows:
1. On or before 5:00 p.m. on November 8,1995, Tri-County shall cause to be
deposited in an interest-bearing account the sum of One Hundred Eighty-five Thousand
Three Hundred Seventeen and 26/100 Dollars ($185,317.26).
2. It is expressly understood that performance by the escrow agent of its duty to
make the disbursement described above is conditioned only and exclusively upon the
expiration of the six-month period. There shall be no other condition relating to
disbursement from escrow.
4. Western Rock shall attempt to collect the Precise account indebtedness from
Precise Concrete. Western Rock's efforts to do so shall be solely and exclusively
determined and governed by Western Rock's own discretion. Accordingly, Western
Rock shall not be required to pursue judicial action, nor formal proceedings of any kind;
but rather may choose to merely conduct informal negotiations in its attempt to collect the
indebtedness. In sum, the efforts to be made and/or methods to be used by Western Rock
in this regard shall be the sole and exclusive prerogative of Western Rock.
9

5. Tri-County expressly acknowledges that Precise Concrete may assert that the
sums owed by Western Rock on the Precise account are incorrect or inaccurate, or that the
labor, services or materials, or some portion thereof, supplied by Western Rock were
defective. Notwithstanding any such assertion, and whether it be proven accurate or not,
Tri-County hereby waives any claims, rights, defenses or causes of action it may have
to reduce, offset or be reimbursed for the settlement funds be paid by Tri-County
pursuant to this agreement.
(R. 61-63).
10. In the discussions on November 8, 1995, Mr. Solt attempted to persuade Mr. Smith
to allow additional time to check with counsel and to otherwise analyze the Formalization
Agreement and the escrow instructions. No time was allowed. Mr. Smith told Mr. Solt that if
the escrow instructions and Formalization Agreement were not signed that day and the funds
deposited, that a mechanic's lien would be filed. (Affidavit of Solt, at f 8. (R. 63)).
11. Finally, after considerable negotiations, Mr. Solt and Mr. Smith agreed that the funds
would be deposited, but that it would be done merely as a showing of good faith and without
commitment of the parties. In that discussion, Mr. Smith agreed that he would not file a
mechanic's lien.

Mr. Solt agreed that he would deposit the funds and sign the escrow

instructions, but that the escrow instructions would not be effective until the parties finalized the
terms of the Formalization Agreement itself. (Affidavit of Solt, at J 9. (R. 63)).
10

12. To confirm this understanding, Mr. Solt sent a letter to Mr. Smith confirming the
following:
Confirming our conversation of today, I have executed a wire
transfer to Southern Utah Title Company, through Sun Capital
Bank. I have also returned to you via fax the escrow instructions
pending finalization of the original agreement. I will forward a
copy of the proposed changes as soon as I have them worked out.
(Affidavit of Solt, at \ 10, (R. 63); Letter from Solt to Smith (R. 82), attached hereto as Exhibit
F).
13. Thereafter, the parties continued to negotiate, by themselves and through their
attorneys, in an attempt to complete the Formalization Agreement. The contract was never
reached. The draft agreement attached to Appellant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment (Attached hereto as Exhibit G) represents several drafts whereby
the parties attempted to finalize the terms of the agreement, which they were unable to do.
(Affidavit of Solt, at 5 12. (R. 64).
Statement of Material Faett in Pispme Pefore the Trial Court
Because it is important for this Court to understand just how many material facts where
in dispute before the trial court, and remain in dispute, Appellant sets forth the following disputed
facts.
1. Appellee claimed in its summary judgment action that the parties entered into an
agreement on or about November 7, 1995. (R. 17). Appellant countered that the parties had only
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begun negotiations for an agreement and that they had not entered into an agreement on or about
November 7, 1995, and that this was a dispute as to a material fact. (R. 58). In support of this
claim, Appellant submitted a sworn statement from Appellant's President, Terry Weaver, that
stated, in pertinent part:
8. The memo contains a reference that the attorney for
Western Rock is to prepare escrow documents. It was my intention
at the time that the terms discussed would not be binding upon
either party until the escrow documents had been prepared by the
attorney for [Appellee], reviewed by us and our attorney, and
signed by the parties. This was specifically discussed by Mr. Smith
and myself in our telephone conversation and we agreed that neither
party would be bound until the final documents had been prepared.
See Affidavit of Terry Weaver, at ^f 8. (R. 94). This single sworn statement was sufficient to
create a dispute as to a material fact and to overcome Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
2.

Appellee claimed in its summary judgment action that pursuant to the alleged

agreement, Appellee agreed to forebear filing a mechanic's lien upon the Project and to use its
best effort to collect money owed to Appellee from Precise. (R. 18). Appellant countered that
there was a material issue of fact in dispute as to the negotiations and ultimate terms of the alleged
agreement. (R. 58). In support of this claim, Appellant submitted sworn statements from Mr.
Weaver and Appellant's Chief Financial Officer, Ronald Stolt, that stated, in pertinent part:
Terry Weaver:
8. The memo contains a reference that the attorney for
Western Rock is to prepare escrow documents. It was my intention
at the time that the terms discussed would not be binding upon
12

either party until the escrow documents had been prepared by the
attorney for [Appellee], reviewed by us and our attorney, and
signed by the parties. This was specifically discussed by Mr. Smith
and myself in our telephone conversation and we agreed that neither
party would be bound until the final documents had been prepared.
9. The following day, on November 8, 1995, I became
aware that Western Rock had submitted to Tri-County for approval
and signature the escrow documents which were discussed. This is
consistent with the agreement reached between myself and Mr.
Smith; that is, that the documents would be prepared and submitted
for signature before the funds were paid.
10. I have subsequently reviewed the documents which
were prepared and submitted by Western Rock and find that they
are inconsistent with the terms discussed between myself and Mr.
Smith in the following particulars:
A. The required payment of the funds within
just a few hours. Mr. Smith and I did not discuss
the exact amount of time that would be needed, but
I do not believe that a few hours on the following
day is a reasonable time.
B. There was no waiver or release of
Western Rock by Tri-County discussed as set forth
in the proposed agreement.
C. We specifically discussed that Western
Rock would use its best efforts to aggressively
collect from Precise. The agreement as submitted
provides that Western Rock may use whatever
efforts it chooses, presumably including no efforts at
all, to collect from Precise.
See Affidavit of Weaver, at f f 8-10. (R. 93-94).

Ronald spit:
4. After reviewing the documents, Mr. Wayne Smith and
I had a telephone conversation. Mr. Smith was in Utah. I was in
Pennsylvania. Mr. Smith advised me that unless Tri-County signed
the documents immediately, as drafted, Western Rock intended to
13

file a mechanic's lien. I expressed objection to this, stating that
Tri-County needed time to consult with its attorneys and to review
the documents in detail. At the time I did not know the specifics of
the terms discussed between Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith the day
before.
5. Initially, Mr. Smith remained firm in his position that the
documents had to be signed and returned, and the funds paid, that
day.
6. I contacted our attorney. Because he was in another
meeting, I only had the chance to talk to him briefly and he only
had the opportunity to review the documents briefly.
7. After the discussions with our attorney, I again contacted
Mr. Smith and explained to him the objections which I had to the
documents. Those objections included the following:
A. Tri-County objected to the release clause
contained in the documents.
B. Tri-County objected to the fact that Western
Rock could unilaterally decide what efforts, if any,
it wanted to expend in pursuing Precise Concrete.
C. We did not have sufficient time to review the
agreement.
D. The agreement was couched in the terms of
payment to Western Rock, rather than as a reserve
deposit.
E. The agreement eliminated the mutuality of
performance.
8. Mr. Smith continued to insist that the funds had to be
paid that day, and that the documents had to be signed. I continued
to insist that we would not sign the documents as drafted.
9. As a matter of compromise, I agreed to pay the funds
into escrow, and to sign the escrow agreement with Southern Utah
Title Company. As Mr. Smith and I discussed, this was done as a
show of good faith but was not intended to be a final agreement of
the parties since the terms of the agreement had not been reached.
See Affidavit of Ronald Solt, at \\ 4-9. (R. 89-90).

14

These sworn statements were sufficient to create a dispute as to several material facts and
to overcome Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
3. Appellee asserted in its summary judgment action that as a demonstration of the
existence of the agreement, Appellant placed $185,317.26 in an interest-bearing escrow account,
the terms of the alleged agreement were consistent with the Confirmation Memo. (R. 18)
Appellant countered that the parties never reached an agreement and that the money was deposited
only as a show of good faith while the parties continued the ultimate terms of the escrow
agreement. (R. 58). In support of these claims, Appellant submitted the sworn statement from
Mr. Solt as set forth in the preceding paragraph, which statement also included the following:
9. As a matter of compromise, I agreed to pay the funds
into escrow, and to sign the escrow agreement with Southern Utah
Title Company. As Mr. Smith and I discussed, this was done as a
show of good faith but was not intended to be a final agreement of
the parties since the terms of the agreement had not been reached.
10. I signed the escrow agreement, I deposited the funds by
wire transfer, and I sent a letter to Mr. Smith indicating that all of
this was done pending finalizing the final terms of the agreement.
A copy of my letter to Mr. Smith is attached hereto as Exhibit A
and incorporated herein by this reference.
See Affidavit of Solt, at f f 4-10 (R. 89-90).
These sworn statements were sufficient to create a dispute as to a material fact and to
overcome Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
4. Appellee asserted in its summary judgment action that the terms of the alleged
agreement were consistent with the Confirmation Memo. Appellant countered that the parties had
15

not reached an agreement and that it did not intend the contents of the Confirmation Memo to be
anything more than a step in the negotiation process and not a final and binding agreement
between the parties. In support of these claims, Appellant submitted sworn statements from Mr.
Weaver and Mr. Stolt, as set forth above and in their affidavits. (R. 58). These sworn statements
were sufficient to create a dispute as to a material fact and to overcome Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
5. Appellee asserted in its summary judgment action that the parties signed an escrow
agreement. (R. 19). Appellant agreed that an escrow agreement was prepared and signed, but
asserted that there were material facts in dispute surrounding the signing of the escrow agreement.
(R. 58). Specifically, the escrow agreement was accompanied by a document entitled Agreement
that was also intended to be signed by the parties and was to be an integrated companion document
to the escrow agreement. (R. 58). The accompanying agreement (referred to by Appellee and
hereinafter as the "Formalization Agreement") contained terms and conditions that were not
acceptable to Appellant and that were not part of the parties' negotiations. (R. 58-59). In support
of these claims, Appellant submitted sworn statements contained in Mr. Solt's affidavit as set forth
above. See Affidavit of Solt, at S% 4-10 (R. 89-90). Again, these sworn statements were
sufficient to overcome Appellee's motion for summary judgment.
6. Appellee asserted in its summary judgment action that the Formalization Agreement
embodied the terms and conditions of the agreement reached by the parties as a result their oral
16

discussions. (R. 19-20). Appellant countered that the Formalization Agreement contained several
additional terms that were never part of the discussions and negotiations between the parties. (R.
59). In support of these claims, Appellant submitted the sworn statements contained in Mr. Stolt's
affidavit as set forth above. (R. 88-91). These sworn statements were sufficient to overcome
Appellee's motion for summary judgment.
SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT
I
This Court is called upon in this context to decide only whether the trial court erred in
determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact. It is not this Court's role to rule
on the merits of the facts alleged by either party, only to determine whether the facts as alleged
have created a genuine issue of material fact. This Court owes no deference to the trial court's
ruling in a summary judgment action. One sworn statement under oath that creates a genuine
issue of material fact, is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. In the present case,
Appellant submitted numerous statements sworn to under oath demonstrating that there were
genuine issues of material fact with respect both to the alleged agreement as well as to the terms
and conditions of the alleged agreement. Therefore, there were numerous genuine issues of
material fact and the trial court erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
II
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As demonstrative of the above point, is the fact that there was no meeting of the minds or
mutual assent of the parties with respect to the alleged agreement or any terms or conditions
thereof. This is evident both from the writings of the parties as well as the sworn statements
submitted by the parties in the summary judgment action. These writings and statements clearly
demonstrate that the parties did not reach an agreement and that Appellant believed at all times
that it was engaged only in negotiations and that it would not be bound by any terms arising out
of the negotiations without its consent to be bound thereby. Because there was no meeting of the
minds or mutual assent of the parties, there could be no agreement. Thus, there were significant
and numerous genuine issues of material fact before the trial court including the most fundamental
question of all~whether the parties actually formed an agreement. Appellee maintained that the
parties had reached an agreement. Appellant submitted testimony sworn to under oath from two
of its officers involved in the negotiations indicating that they did not reach an agreement but were
only engaged in preliminary discussions and negotiations. This is a classic genuine issue of
material fact. Therefore, there were numerous genuine issues of material fact and the trial court
erred in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Ill
Appellee asserts that the parties were bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the
Confirmation Memo. Appellee asserts that the Confirming Memo is evidence that the parties had
reached an agreement. However, on the very day following the Confirmation Memo, Appellee
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sent to Appellant the Formalization Agreement and demanded that it be signed by Appellant. The
Formalization Agreement contained numerous terms and conditions that were neither part of the
Confirmation Memo nor the parties discussions and negotiations. Under law, the Formalization
Agreement, with terms and conditions that differed from the Confirming Memo, is clear evidence
that no agreement had been reached between the parties and that they were still in the negotiation
process. These two documents demonstrate that there were genuine issues of material fact before
the trial. Therefore, there were numerous genuine issues of material fact and the trial court erred
in granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
IV
Appellant argued before the trial court that Appellee should be estopped from enforcing
the Confirming Memo because of its express rejection of the Confirming Memo in the
Formalization Agreement. The underlying argument here is that because there was a genuine
issue of material fact, generated in part because of Appellee's rejection of the Confirming Memo,
Appellee should be estopped from enforcing the Confirming Memo. Additionally, because
estoppel is highly factual in nature and is not easily subject to disposition in a summary judgment
proceeding. Therefore, there were genuine issues of material fact and the trial court erred in
granting Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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ARGUMENT
I
APPELLANT MET ITS BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING
THE EXISTENCE OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS AND
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING APPELLEE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This Court should keep in mind that it is not necessary for Appellant, in this context, to
prevail on the merits of legal arguments and analysis with respect to its underlying claims and
defenses before the trial court. It is likewise not even necessary that Appellant somehow prove
its facts by a preponderance of the evidence, which Appellant was not afforded the opportunity
to do. Additionally, it is not even necessary for Appellant to demonstrate that it will prevail at
trial on the merits of its claims and defenses-this would be an irrelevant consideration for this
Court in this context. It is only necessary that Appellant demonstrate that there was and is a
genuine issue of material fact. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 768 P.2d at 957. If Appellant carries this
burden, and demonstrates that one single material fact is in dispute, this Court is mandated by law
to reverse the summary judgment and remand this case to the trial court for whatever proceedings
the trial court and the parties deem necessary and appropriate. Id.
This Court should also keep in mind that "[o]ne sworn statement under oath [involving a
material fact] is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding the entry of
summary judgment." Id. Additionally, this Court must review all relevant facts, and all
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, in a light most favorable to the losing party-Appellant.
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Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 460. This has been interpreted to mean that this Court must resolve all
questions of doubt in favor of Appellant. Draper Bank & Trust Co. v. Lawson, 675 P.2d 1174
(Utah 1983)
Without addressing the merits of the opposing claims at this point, the pedagogical and
laborious factual exercise set forth above in this Brief, clearly demonstrates that there was at least
one, and in fact many, genuine issue of material fact that should have precluded entry of summary
judgment. The most ominous and certainly dispositive genuine issue of material fact is with
respect to whether the parties actually entered into an agreement or whether they were merely
engaged in negotiations with the hope of reaching an agreement. The following summary of
genuine issues of material fact demonstrates this point:
1.

Appellee claimed that the parties reached a binding agreement.

Appellant submitted statements made under oath from its President and Chief
Financial Officer, both of whom were participating in the negotiations,
demonstrating that Appellant did not believe that the parties had reached an
agreement, but, at most, that the parties had engaged in the negotiation process
with the hope that they might at some point settle their dispute with each other.3
3

This issue revolves around whether there was a meeting of the minds between the
parties. This determination has in fact not yet been determined. However, it is not necessary for
Appellant to prove that there was not a meeting of the minds. It is only necessary for Appellant
to demonstrate, which it has done, that there was a material factual dispute with respect to whether
there was a meeting of the minds.
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Appellant therefore carried its burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material
fact and the entry of summary judgment was improper. Id.
2. Appellee alleged that there were certain terms and conditions that were
material to the alleged agreement. Appellant submitted statements made under oath
from its President and Chief Financial Officer, both of whom were participating
in the negotiations, demonstrating not only that there was a material fact in dispute
as to the existence of the alleged agreement, but also as to the terms of alleged
agreement. Simply put, Appellant submitted sworn statements placing the alleged
terms of the agreement in dispute.4 Appellant therefore carried its burden of
demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact and the entry of summary judgment
was improper. Id.
3. Appellee alleged that Appellant's act of placing $185,317.85 in an
interest-bearing escrow account demonstrated the existence of the agreement.
Appellant submitted statements made under oath from its Chief Financial Officer,
who was participating in the negotiations, that the money was not deposited as a
result of an agreement, but in actuality because of duress and threats by Appellee
and in response to the duress and threats as a show of good faith by Appellant
4

Appellant notes that if there is a genuine material factual issue over the alleged terms
of the agreement, under general contract law as discussed below in the text, there was not a
meeting of the minds and, a fortiori, no agreement.
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while the parties continued to negotiate towards and agreement.

Appellant

therefore carried its burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact and
the entry of summary judgment was improper. Id.
4. Appellee claimed that the terms of the alleged agreement ultimately
reached by the parties was consistent with what it referred to as the Confirmation
Memo.

Appellant submitted statements made under oath from its President and

Chief Financial Officer, both of whom were participating in the negotiations,
demonstrating that the Appellant intended the Confirmation Memo to be nothing
more than a step in the negotiation process and not a final and binding agreement
between the parties. Appellant therefore carried its burden of demonstrating a
genuine issue of material fact and the entry of summary judgment was improper.
Id.
5. Appellee claimed that the parties signed an escrow agreement and that
this demonstrated that the parties had reached an overall agreement. Appellant
submitted statements made under oath from its Chief Financial Officer, who was
participating in the negotiations, demonstrating that the escrow agreement was
accompanied by a document entitled "Formalization Agreement" that Appellee
demanded that Appellant sign but which contained terms and conditions that were
not acceptable to Appellant and that were not part of the parties' negotiations.
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Appellant therefore carried its burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material
fact and the entry of summary judgment was improper. Id.
There is no question that Appellant carried its burden in demonstrating that there were
genuine issues of material fact precluding the entry of summary judgment. In this case it was the
ultimate material fact that was and is in dispute-whether the parties actually reached and entered
into an agreement. Even if there is a question as to whether Appellant has demonstrated the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the outcome is the same. This Court must resolve
all such questions in favor of Appellant and reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand this
case for further proceedings.
II
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS OR MUTUAL
ASSENT AND THEREFORE THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT
AND THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL
COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
As a preliminary matter, and at the risk of being repetitive, it is not incumbent upon this
Court to determine whether there actually was or was not a meeting of the minds or mutual assent.
On the contrary, this Court's job is far easier. This Court must only determine whether there was
a genuine issue of material fact with respect to a meeting of the minds or mutual assent. Again,
if there is any question as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact over these issues,
Appellant wins. That is, this Court must resolve all such questions or doubt in favor of Appellant
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which leaves only one course of action-a reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 460. The following discussion and analysis clearly demonstrates that there
were genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the parties had a meeting of the minds
or whether their was mutual assent to the alleged agreement.
The body of law on mutual assent (meeting of the minds) is vast, and it is sometimes
unclear. However, there are several general principals which can be applied to the analysis of this
case. The fundamental principal which controls in this case is that there must be mutual assent
or meeting of the minds on all essential elements or terms in order to form a binding
contract. Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987) (emphasis added); see also 17
Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts § 26 (1991). It is also fundamental that there can be no contract unless
all of the parties involved intended to enter into a contract.

17 Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts § 26

(1991).
In the present case, as discussed in detail above, there was no mutual assent or a meeting
of the minds on all essential elements or terms of the alleged agreement. Consequently, there
could be no agreement. Vasels, 740 P.2d at 1377-1378. Not only was there no meeting of the
minds or mutual assent between the adverse parties, but even Appellee admits that there was not
a formal agreement reached between the two parties. Wayne Smith, Appellee's Cedar City
Manager, testified in one part of his affidavit that there was an agreement reached (and implicitly
that he intended to form a contract), and yet in the very same affidavit he acknowledges that "the
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agreement was to be more formally set forth in a future document." (R. 36-39). As discussed
above and as will be more folly discussed below, the "future document" was vastly different than
the alleged agreement terms specified in the Confirmation Memo—this is sufficient to show that
there was no meeting of the minds or mutual assent.
In Crismon v. Western Company of North America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987), the
parties stated in correspondence that they would enter into a lease agreement in accordance with
the terms generally specified therein. The court held that the correspondence, even though it
expressed the terms of the leases, did not constitute a contract between the parties because they
contemplated that another agreement to formalize the transaction would be prepared. The Court
stated:
Under basic contract law principles, a contract is not formed
without a meeting of the minds. [Contractual mutual assent
requires asset by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so
that their minds meet as to all the terms. Determining whether the
specific terms omitted were essential to the agreement requires an
examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances under
which the agreement was entered into.
In this case, the language in Eppes1 January 11 letter
indicates that the parties were still negotiating. The letter states
that Western's legal department would be sending a prepared
lease. That statement indicates that both parties understood that a
binding contract would be entered into in the future. Subsequent
correspondence between the parties also demonstrates that the
January 11 letter evidenced preliminary negotiations.
Finally, the subsequent leases exchanged by the parties
demonstrate that there was no meeting of the minds. Eppes sent
Crismon a lease which Crismon rejected by sending back a lease
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with different terms with regard to term, rent, maintenance,
insurance and default. The parties' exchange of proposed leases
clearly demonstrates that they did not have a meeting of the
minds as to all of the essential terms of the lease.
Id. at 1221-1222 (emphasis added).
Crismon case is substantively similar to the present case. In both cases, the writings
expressed that a subsequent document would be prepared. In both cases, one of the parties
subsequently prepared a detailed agreement, which included terms and conditions which were not
covered in the original negotiations or correspondence. In both cases, the parties subsequently
exchanged several drafts of the anticipated final agreement. In Crismon, the Court held that the
preliminary correspondence did not constitute an agreement. In this case, there is at least an issue
of fact as to whether there was a meeting of the minds.
There is also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the parties intended an
agreement based on the Confirmation Memo and discussions. Appellant claims that there was an
agreement reached on November 7, 1995, and that the agreement is memorialized by the written
Confirmation Memo sent from Mr. Weaver to Mr. Smith. Mr. Weaver, on the other hand, states
in sworn testimony that there was to be no agreement until the written document to be provided
by Appellee's attorney had been prepared, reviewed and signed by both parties. See Affidavit of
Weaver, at S 8. (R. 93-94). The Confirmation Memo states that "[Appellee] counsel will draw
up escrow document and forward to [Appellant]". (R. 72). Mr. Weaver's intention was that until
the escrow documents were finalized, there was not an agreement that would bind either party.
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See Affidavit of Weaver, at *[ 8. (R. 93-94). Appellee's own conduct substantiates Mr. Weaver's
position. The day after the Confirmation Memo, documents were prepared and submitted to
Appellant for signature. If the contract was intended to be memorialized in the confirming memo,
when and why, then, did the Appellee prepare an agreement significantly different from the
confirming memo? Appellee must have considered that negotiations were still open because the
document contained many additional terms beyond those set forth in the alleged confirming memo.
Some of the additional terms and conditions were substantial and significantly altered the rights
of the parties. (R. 60-61). The law on the point is clear and solidly supports Appellant's
position.
[T]he fact that parties to negotiations contemplated the drawing and
execution of a formal written contract is regarded in numerous cases
as evidence that they intended the prior oral or informal agreement,
by correspondence or otherwise, to be merely tentative and not
final. Indeed, this circumstance has been considered as "strong
evidence" that the parties did not intend that the negotiations should
amount to an agreement prior to the execution of the formal
writing.
17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 38 (1991).
The fact that several drafts of the Formalization Agreement containing substantially
differing terms were submitted by the parties must, under law, be considered strong evidence that
there was not an agreement in the first place, but merely negotiations, thus raising a genuine issue
of material fact to be decided by the trier of fact. Crismon, 742 P.2d at 1222. If nothing else,
it clearly and positively demonstrates that there were genuine issues of material fact with respect
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to the alleged agreement and that the trial court erred in granting Appellee's motion for summary
judgment.
in
APPELLEE'S ACTIONS ON THE DAY FOLLOWING THE
CONFIRMATION MEMO DEMONSTRATE THAT THERE
WAS NO AGREEMENT AND THAT THERE WERE
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT SURROUNDING THE TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF THE ALLEGED
Appellee argued below that there was not a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
the agreement that was embodied in the Confirming Memo. However, Appellee's actions on the
very next day completely undercut Appellee's position and just as clearly demonstrate that there
were considerable genuine issues of material fact with respect to the agreement and the terms
thereof. Specifically, the Formalization Agreement sent by Appellee to Appellant on the day
following the Confirming Memo was totally inconsistent with the Confirmation Memo and
contained numerous terms and conditions that had not been part of the parties communications or
negotiations.

The proposed Formalization Agreement contained the following significant

provisions which were not part of the Confirmation Memo:
A. The Formalization Agreement imposed a time limited in paragraph la of less
than four hours. Since there was no time specified in the Confirmation Memo, the law
will imply a reasonable time. There is an issue of fact as to whether four hours is a
reasonable time.

This was not part of the Confirmation Memo, the parties'
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communications or negotiations. See Affidavit of Weaver, at \ 10 (R. 94); See Affidavit
of Solt, at 1 7 (R. 89-90).
B. The Formalization Agreement contained a complete waiver by Appellant of all
defenses to the quality of the materials, and "any claims, rights, defenses or cause of
action it may have to reduce, offset or be reimbursed for the settlement funds." This was
not part of the Confirmation Memo, the parties' communications or negotiations. See
Affidavit of Weaver, at \ 10 (R. 94); See Affidavit of Solt, at \ 7 (R. 89-90).
C. The Confirmation Memo requires Appellee to use "its best efforts to collect
monies owed." The Formalization Agreement, on the other hand, is essentially illusory
on the point, granting to Appellee the right to use whatever efforts it chooses, or no efforts
at all, in "the sole and exclusive prerogative of [Appellee]." This was not part of the
Confirmation Memo, the parties' communications or negotiations.

See Affidavit of

Weaver, at 110 (R. 94); See Affidavit of Solt, at 1 7 (R. 89-90).
D. The Formalization Agreement, in Section lc, removes the mutuality of the
obligation contained in the Confirmation Memo by providing that the funds will be paid
to ^AppeUee} at the end of six (6) months vrithoutregatdtothe performance by tAppellee}.
This was not part of the Confirmation Memo, the parties' communications or negotiations.
See Affidavit of Weaver, at \ 10 (R. 94); See Affidavit of Solt, at 1 7 (R. 89-90).
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These differences are so substantial and so materially different from the Confirmation
Memo and the parties' communications and negotiations, that Appellant could not, in good faith,
agree to them. After considerable discussion, and after direct threats by Appellee that it would
file a mechanic's lien if Appellant would not immediately sign the agreement, the parties finally
agreed to convey the funds into escrow pending finalizing the agreement itself. See Affidavit of
Solt, at % 9 (R. 90). By imposing conditions beyond those contained in the Confirmation Memo,
the parties' communications and negotiations, and by forcing Appellant to act in a manner directly
inconsistent with the Confirmation Memo, if there ever was a contract between them for the
escrow of the funds, it was repudiated by Appellee and the funds paid were under the separate and
distinct agreement which was reached the following day; that is, that the funds would be conveyed
into escrow in good faith pending the finalizing of the formal agreement. At the very least, the
terms and conditions in the Formalization Agreement and the Confirming Memo demonstrate that
the parties never had a meeting of the minds or mutu£T assent to the agreement or the terms
thereof and that there are significant genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, the trial court
erred in granting Appellee's motion for summary judgment.
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IV
THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL IS HIGHLY FACTUAL IN
NATURE AND IS NOT READILY SUBJECT TO
DISPOSITION ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT ESPECIALLY
WHERE, AS IN THIS CASE, NUMEROUS MATERIAL
ISSUES OF FACT REMAIN IN DISPUTE
Appellant argued below that, based on the events discussed in the previous section,
Appellee should be estoppedfromnow trying to enforce the Confirmation Memo-a document that
it rejected when it submitted to Appellant the Formalization Agreement containing significant and
material differences. Estoppel is by nature highly factually dependent and is not readily subject
to disposition on summary judgment. See United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First
National Bank, 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982); Ehlers & Ehlers v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789, 792
(Utah App. 1991). This is especially true where, as in this case, there are serious and numerous
genuine issues of material fact surrounding the underlying reasons that Appellant is requesting
Appellee to be estopped.
Estoppel arises when one of the parties changes position or adopts a cause of action in
reliance on the representations of another. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d
688, 691 (Utah 1985). In this case, the funds were paid by Appellant, not in accordance with the
Confirmation Memo, but with the clear understanding that there was no contract and that there
would be subsequent discussions. See Affidavit of Solt, at ^f 9 (R. 90). Therefore, the trial court
erred in granting Appellee' motion for summary judgment.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, there are numerous genuine issues of material fact
precluding summary judgment. The trial court therefore erred in granting Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment in the fact of the genuine issues of material fact. This Court should therefore
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
DATED this 18th day of April, 1997.
HIGBEE & JENSEN
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BLAINE T. HOFELmG
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS
CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania
Corporation,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
TRI-COUNTY CONFINEMENT
SYSTEMS, INC., a Pennsylvania
Corporation,

Civil No. 95-CV-115
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.
The Defendant above named, by and through counsel, submits its Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. This memorandum is submitted
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Rule 4-501(2) of the Utah Code
of Judicial Administration.
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the Defendant
submits the following statement of material facts which the Defendant contends to be at issue.
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The material facts are numbered by paragraph to correspond to the statement of material facts
contained in the Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
beginning at page 2.
8. There is a material issue of fact as to whether there was an agreement entered into
between Tri-County and Western Rock on or about November 6-7, 1995. Affidavit of Terry
Weaver, 1 8.
9. There is an issue of fact as to the negotiations, and ultimate terms, of the alleged
contract. Weaver Affid., 11 8-10; Affidavit of Ronald Solt, 11 4-9.
11. There was never a final contract reached, because the funds were deposited only as
a show of good faith while the parties continued to negotiate towards the ultimate terms of the
escrow. Solt Affid., 1 4-10. Thus, there is an issue of fact as to whether there was an
agreement, and if there was an agreement, what the terms thereof were.
12. There is an issue of fact as to whether there was an agreement, and if so, what were
the terms of the agreement.

Paragraph 12 of the Statement of Facts in the Plaintiffs

memorandum simply recites the terms of the Confirmation Memo. Weaver Affid.; Solt Affid.
13. As to paragraph 13, the Defendant agrees that an escrow agreement was prepared
and signed, but believes there are other additional facts related thereto. The escrow agreement
was indeed prepared by Western Rock's counsel and forwarded to Tri-County. However, it was
included with a document entitled Agreement which was also intended to be signed by the parties
and was to be an integrated companion document with the escrow instructions. The Agreement,
reference herein as the Formalization Agreement to be consistent with the Plaintiffs
2

memorandum, contained terms and conditions which were not acceptable to Tri-County* Thus,
there are issues of fact as to whether there was a contract, and if there was, what the terms of
the contract were. Id.
14. There is an issue of fact as to the form and effect of the Formalization Agreement
referred to in paragraph 14 of the Plaintiffs memorandum. Plaintiffs counsel characterized it
as "setting forth in greater detail the operative terms of settlement." As a matter of fact, it
contains several additional terms that were never included in the discussions, and the Plaintiff
threatened to file its mechanic's lien if the Formalization Agreement was not signed. Thus,
there is an issue of fact as to the terms, nature and effect of the terms submitted in the
Formalization Agreement. Id.
15. There is an issue of fact as to the proposed terms of the Formalization Agreement,
the relationship between the Formalization Agreement and the other discussions and
correspondence between the parties, and the conduct of the parties at the time the Formalization
Agreement and escrow agreement were submitted. Id.
16. There is an issue of fact as to the proposed terms of the Formalization Agreement,
the relationship between the Formalization Agreement and the other discussions and
correspondence between the parties, and the conduct of the parties at the time the Formalization
Agreement and escrow agreement were submitted. Id.
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant submits the following statement of facts, as it sees them. This statement
of facts includes facts which are not disputed, the Defendant's version of the facts which are
3
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A

disputed, and additional facts which are not referenced at all by the Plaintiff, all of which the
Defendant believes to be material.
1. Tri-County is a general contractor on a construction project in Beaver County, Utah,
owned and operated by Circle Four Farms (the "Project"). Plaintiffs Memorandum, Statement
of Material Facts, 1 1.
2. Western Rock Products provided concrete work on the Project at the request of
Precise Concrete, a subcontractor on the Project. Id., 11 2-5.
3. For the purposes of this motion, Defendant agrees that there is a balance owing to
Western Rock by Precise in the amount of One Hundred Ninety Thousand Three Hundred
Thirty-two and 37/100 Dollars ($190,332.37). Id. , 1 5 . By admitting this fact for the purposes
of this motion, the Defendant does not agree to be bound by this fact at any other point in the
proceedings.
4. There were negotiations held between Western Rock and Tri-County regarding the
nonpayment by Precise. Due to a pending financial transaction, Circle Four and Tri-County did
indeed wish to avoid the filing of a mechanic's lien upon the Project. Weaver Affid., 1 5.
5. In order to avoid the filing of a the mechanic's lien, the parties discussed an
arrangement whereby certain funds would be escrowed by Tri-County on certain conditions.
Weaver Affid., 115-7.
6. The discussions regarding the terms of such an arrangement began with Wayne Smith,
acting for Western Rock, and Terry Weaver, acting for Tri-County. Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith
discussed the various points to be included in any such agreement by telephone on or about
4

1995, or terms different than those in the discussions and the Confirmation Memo. The
applicable paragraphs, with the additional and different terms highlighted, all of which are
substantial and material, are quoted from the Formalization Agreement as follows:
la. On or before 5:00p.m. on November 8, 1995, Tri-County shall cause to be
deposited in an interest-bearing account the sum of One Hundred Eighty-five Thousand
Three Hundred Seventeen and 26/100 Dollars ($185,317.26).
2. It is expressly understood that performance by the escrow agent of its duty to
make the disbursement described above is conditioned only and exclusively upon the
expiration of the six-month period. There shall be no other condition relating to
disbursement from escrow.
4. Western Rock shall attempt to collect the Precise account indebtedness from
Precise Concrete. Western Rock's efforts to do so shall be solely and exclusively
determined and governed by Western Rock's own discretion. Accordingly, Western
Rock shall not be required to pursue judicial action, nor formal proceedings of any kind;
but rather may choose to merely conduct informal negotiations in its attempt to collect
the indebtedness. In sum, the efforts to be made and/or methods to be used by Western
Rock in this regard shall be the sole and exclusive prerogative of Western Rock.
5. Tri-County expressly acknowledges that Precise Concrete may assert that the
sums owed by Western Rock on the Precise account are incorrect or inaccurate, or that
the labor, services or materials, or some portion thereof, supplied by Western Rock were
defective. Notwithstanding any such assertion, and whether it be proven accurate or not,
6
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November 6, 1995. The discussions between Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith were followed by a
confirmation memo sent to Mr. Smith by Mr. Weaver on November 7 (the "Confirmation
Memo"). A copy of the Confirmation Memo is attached to the Plaintiffs memorandum as
Exhibit C, and is attached to this memorandum as Exhibit A. The confirmation memo contains
several crucial points. Those dispute are quoted as follows:
A.

"Western shall use its best efforts to collect monies owed and resolve

differences with Precise.M
B.

"Western agrees to provide internal documents to Tri-County regarding

Precise account in order assist in concluding matters."
C. "Western counsel will draw up escrow document and forward to Tri-County."
7. On the following day, November 8, 1995, Wayne Smith contacted Ron Solt, Chief
Financial Officer of Tri-County Confinement Systems, Inc. Mr. Smith supplied Mr. Solt, by
fax, with proposed escrow instructions, and with a proposed agreement (the "Formalization
Agreement") prepared by Western's attorney, presumable to carry into effect the discussions
held the day before. A copy of the Formalization Agreement and the escrow instructions, as
submitted, are attached hereto as Exhibits B and C, respectively.
8. In the conversation on November 8, 1995, Mr. Smith advised Mr. Solt that TriCounty was required to sign the Formalization Agreement and the Escrow Agreement and
deposit the funds that day, or Western Rock would file its lien. Solt Affid., 1 4.
9. The Formalization Agreement contained additional terms which were not included in
the prior discussions of the parties, and which were not included in the memo of November 7,
5

Tri-County hereby waives any claims, rights, defenses or causes of action it may
have to reduce, offset or be reimbursed for the settlement funds be paid by TriCounty pursuant to this agreement.
Each of the paragraphs set forth above are in addition to or different from the terms that were
discussed between Mr. Smith and Mr. Weaver on the days before, and they substantially and
materially alter the rights of the parties.
10. In the discussions on November 8, 1995, Mr. Solt attempted to persuade Mr. Smith
to allow additional time to check with counsel and to otherwise analyze the Formalization
Agreement and the escrow instructions. No time was allowed. Mr. Smith told Mr. Solt that
if the escrow instructions and Formalization Agreement were not signed that day and the funds
deposited, that a mechanic's lien would be filed. Solt Affid., 1 8.
11. Finally, after considerable negotiations, Mr. Solt and Mr. Smith agreed that the
funds would be deposited, but that it would be done merely as a showing of good faith and
without commitment of the parties. In that discussion, Mr. Smith agreed that he would not file
a mechanic's lien. Mr. Solt agreed that he would deposit the funds and sign the escrow
instructions, but that the escrow instructions would not be effective until the partiesfinalizedthe
terms of the Formalization Agreement itself. Solt Affid., 1 9.
12. To confirm this understanding, Mr. Solt sent a letter to Mr. Smith confirming the
following:
Confirming our conversation of today, I have executed a wire transfer to Southern
Utah Title Company, through Sun Capital Bank, I have also returned to you via
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fax the escrow instructions pending finalization of the original agreement. I will
forward a copy of the proposed changes as soon as I have them worked out.
A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit D and incorporated herein by this reference.
SoltAffid., 1 10.
13. Thereafter, the parties continued to negotiate, by themselves and through their
attorneys, in an attempt to complete the Formalization Agreement. The contract was never
reached. The draft attached as Exhibit E to the Plaintiffs memorandum represents several drafts
whereby the parties attempted to finalize the terms of the agreement, which they were unable
to do. SoltAffid., 1 12.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS OR MUTUAL ASSENT, AND
THUS THERE WAS NO CONTRACT
The body of law on mutual assent (meeting of the minds) is vast, and it is sometimes
unclear. However, there are several general principals which can be applied to the analysis of
this case. The fundamental principal which controls the issue is that there must be mutual assent
or meeting of the minds on all essential elements or terms in order to form a binding contract.
Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987); 17 Am. Jur. 2d. Contracts § 26 (1991).
It is also fundamental that there can be no contract unless all of the parties involved intended to
enter one. Id. §27. In the case at bar, there are issues of fact on both of these fundamental
points. Wayne Smith has testified in affidavit that there was an agreement reached (and
implicitly that he intended to form a contract). Yet in the very same affidavit he acknowledges
8

that "the agreement was to be more formally set forth in a future document." Smith Affid., 1
17. As will be more fully discussed below, the "future document" was vastly different than the
alleged agreement terms specified in the Confirmation Memo.
Terry Weaver for Tri-County has testified in affidavit that there was no contract until the
final documents were signed, and that the funds would not be paid until that point. Weaver
Affid., 1 8. The Confirmation Memo was preliminary. In Crismon v. Western Company of
North America, 742 P.2d 1219, the parties stated in correspondence that they would enter into
a lease agreement in accordance with the terms specified.

The court held that the

correspondence, even though it expressed the terms of the leases, did not constitute a contract
between the parties because they contemplated that another agreement to formalize the
transaction would be prepared. The Court stated:
Under basic contract law principles, a contract is not formed without a meeting
of the minds. [Contractual mutual assent requires asset by all parties to the same
thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms. Determining
whether the specific terms omitted were essential to the agreement requires an
examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances under which the
agreement was entered into.
In this case, the language in Eppes' January 11 letter indicates that the
parties were still negotiating. The letter states that Western's legal
department would be sending a prepared lease. That statement indicates that
both parties understood that a binding contract would be entered into in the
future. Subsequent correspondence between the parties also demonstrates
that the January 11 letter evidenced preliminary negotiations.
Finally, the subsequent leases exchanged by the parties demonstrate
that there was no meeting of the minds. Eppes sent Crismon a lease which
Crismon rejected by sending back a lease with different terms with regard to
term, rent, maintenance, insurance and default. The parties' exchange of
proposed leases clearly demonstrates that they did not have a meeting of the
minds as to all of the essential terms of the lease.
9

Id. at 1221-1222.
Note how many facts from the Crismon case are also present here. In both cases, the
writings expressed that a subsequent document would be prepared. In both cases, one of the
parties subsequently prepared a detailed agreement, which included terms and conditions which
were not covered in the original correspondence.

In both cases, the parties subsequently

exchanged several drafts of the anticipated final agreement. In Crismon, the Court held that the
preliminary correspondence did not constitute an agreement. In this case, there is at least an
issue of fact as to whether there was a meeting of the minds.
There is also an issue of fact as to whether the parties intended an agreement based on
the Confirmation Memo and discussions. The Plaintiff claims that there was an agreement
reached on November 7, 1995, and that the agreement is memorialized by the written
Confirmation Memo sent from Terry Weaver to Wayne Smith. Terry Weaver, on the other
hand, states that there was no agreement until the written document to be provided by the
attorney for the Plaintiff had been prepared and signed. Weaver Affid. 1 8. The Confirmation
Memo states this precisely as follows:
Western counsel will draw up escrow document and forward to Tri-County.
Mr. Weaver's intention was that until the escrow documents were finalized, there was not an
agreement that would bind either party. Weaver Affid., t 8. The Plaintiffs own conduct
substantiates Mr. Weaver's position.

The next day documents were prepared and were

submitted to Tri-County for signature. If the contract was intended to be memorialized in the
confirming memo, when, then, did the Plaintiff prepare an agreement significantly different from
10

it? The Plaintiff must have considered that negotiations were still open because the document
contained many additional terms beyond those set forth in the alleged confirming memo. Some
of them were substantial and significantly altered the rights of the parties. See 11 6, 9,
Defendant's Statement of Facts. The general law on the point solidly supports the Defendant's
position.
[Tjhe fact that parties to negotiations contemplated the drawing and execution of
a formal written contract is regarded in numerous cases as evidence that they
intended the prior oral or informal agreement, by correspondence or otherwise,
to be merely tentative and not final. Indeed, this circumstance has been
considered as "strong evidence" that the parties did not intend that the
negotiations should amount to an agreement prior to the execution of the formal
writing.
17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 38 (1991).
The fact that several drafts of the Formalization Agreement containing substantially
differing terms were submitted by the parties may be considered as evidence that there was not
an agreement in the first place, thus raising an issue of fact to be decided by the trier of fact.
Crismon v. Western Company of North America, supra, at 1222. At root, whether there is or
is not a contract depends on the intention of the parties. In this case, we have two parties whose
intentions were different. Both of their intentions are sufficiently justified in the facts, and there
is, therefore, an issue of fact to be decided by the trier of fact.
POINT n
IF THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT REACHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE CONFIRMATION MEMO, THAT AGREEMENT WAS REPUDIATED
AND THE ESCROWED FUNDS WERE PAID PURSUANT TO ANOTHER
AGREEMENT ENTERED THE FOLLOWING DAY

11
W

Even if there was a contract based on the confirming memo, the circumstances of the
following day completely changed that agreement. The Formalization Agreement submitted by
the Plaintiff the following day was totally inconsistent with the Confirmation Memo. The
proposed Formalization Agreement, which is set forth as Exhibit B to this memorandum,
contained the following significant provisions which were not part of the confirming memo.
A. The Formalization Agreement imposed a time limited in paragraph la of less
than four hours. Since there was no time specified in the Confirmation Memo, the law
will imply a reasonable time. There is an issue of fact as to whether four hours is a
reasonable time.
B. The Formalization Agreement contained a complete waiver by Tri-County of
all defenses to the quality of the materials, and Many claims, rights, defenses or cause of
action it may have to reduce, offset or be reimbursed for the settlement funds."
C. The Confirmation Memo requires Western to use "its best efforts to collect
monies owed." The Formalization Agreement, on the other hand, is essentially illusory
on the point, granting to Western Rock the right to use whatever efforts it chooses, or
no efforts at all, in "the sole and exclusive prerogative of Western Rock."
D. The Formalization Agreement, in Section lc, removes the mutuality of the
obligation contained in the Confirmation Memo by providing that the funds will be paid
to Western Rock at the end of six (6) months without regard to the performance by
Western Rock.
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These differences are so substantial and so materially different from the confirming
memo, that Tri-County would not agree to them. After considerable discussion, and after direct
threats by Western Rock to file a mechanic's lien if Tri-County would not sign the agreement,
the parties finally agreed to convey the funds into escrow pending finalizing the agreement itself.
By imposing conditions beyond those contained in the Confirmation Memo, and by forcing TriCounty to act in a manner directly inconsistent with the Confirmation Memo, if there ever was
a contract between them for the escrow of the funds, it was repudiated by Western Rock and the
funds paid were under the separate and distinct agreement which was reached the following day;
that is, that the funds would be conveyed into escrow in good faith pending the finalizing of the
formal agreement.
As a general principle, where one party to a contract repudiates it or refuses to
perform it, the other party is not obligated to perform his promise, and such
nonperformance does not render the other party liable in damages.
17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 704 (1991). In the Plaintiffs best case, there is an issue of fact
as to the circumstances surrounding the payment into escrow on November 8, 1995, and the
legal effect thereof.
POINT in

ESTOPPEL IS ALSO AN ISSUE OF FACT
The Plaintiff should be estopped from enforcing the terms of the Confirmation Memo,
if it constituted a contract, because of its actions on November 8. Estoppel arises when one of
the parties changes position or adopts a cause of action in reliance on the representations of
another. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985). In this
13
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case, the funds were paid by Tri-County, not in accordance with the Confirmation Memo, but
with the clear understanding that there was no contract and that there would be subsequent
discussions. Solt Affid., ^ 9. Estoppel is an issue of fact. Ehlers & Ehlers v. Carbon County•,
805 P.2d 789, 792 (Utah App. 1991). United American Life Insurance Co. v. Zions First
National Bank, 641 P.2d 158 (Utah 1982). There are issues of fact on this issue precluding
summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
There are many material issues of fact in this case. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment should be denied and the Court should be entitled to consider all of the evidence at
a trial, to sort out the facts and apply the appropriate law.
DATED this *f

day of April, 1996.
HIGBEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

THtfMAS M. HIGI
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the __f£^day of April, 1996, a true and correct copy of the
within and foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, first-class postage prepaid, to the following:
Terry L. Wade, Esq.
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart
P.O. Box 400
St. George, Utah 84771
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Exhibit B

F I Li I
APR 1 5 1S96
THOMAS M. HIGBEE (1484)
HIGBEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
250 South Main Street
P. O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84721
Telephone: (801) 586-4404
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS
CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania
Corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY WEAVER

Plaintiff,
vs.
TRI-COUNTY CONFINEMENT
SYSTEMS, INC., a Pennsylvania
Corporation,

Civil No. 95-CV-115
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF

)
: ss.
)

Terry Weaver, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1. This affiant is an individual residing in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. This affidavit is
made upon this affiant's own personal knowledge.
2. This affiant is the /r*i>/sn 7

of Tri-County Confinement Systems, Inc., a

Pennsylvania corporation, doing business in Beaver County, Utah, and the Defendant herein.

°l*

3. On or about November 6, 1995, this affiant had a telephone conversation with Wayne
Smith, on behalf of Western Rock Products, the Plaintiff herein.

At the time of the

conversation, this affiant was in the State of Pennsylvania at the business offices of Tri-County.
Mr. Smith was in Utah, at the offices of Western Rock Products.
4. The center topic of conversation was the balance which Western Rock Products
claims is owed by Precise Concrete on a project located in Beaver County, Utah, known as the
Circle Four Farms project.
5. During the course of the conversation, the parties discussed several things related to
that account. This affiant advised Mr. Smith that neither Tri-County nor Circle Four Farms
wanted a mechanic's lien to be placed on the Circle Four Farms project because of pending
financing. Mr. Smith expressed that he would refrain from filing a mechanic's lien if other
security could be arranged.
6. The discussions ended up with a tentative approval by Mr. Smith and myself which
would prevent the filing of the mechanic's lien and at the same time protect the security position
of Western Rock.
7. The general terms of the conversation are set forth in the memorandum which I sent
to Mr. Smith the following day, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by this reference.
8. The memo contains a reference that the attorney for Western Rock is to prepare the
escrow documents. It was my intention at the time that the terms discussed would not be
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binding upon either party until the escrow documents had been prepared by the attorney for
Western Rock, reviewed by us and our attorney, and signed by the parties.

This was

specifically discussed by Mr. Smith and myself in our telephone conversation and we agreed that
neither party would be bound until the final documents had been prepared and signed.
9. The following day, on November 8, 1995, I became aware that Western Rock had
submitted to Tri-County for approval and signature the escrow documents which were discussed.
This is consistent with the agreement reached between myself and Mr. Smith; that is, that the
documents would be prepared and submitted for signature before the funds were paid.
10. I have subsequently reviewed the documents which were prepared and submitted by
Western Rock and find that they are inconsistent with the terms discussed between myself and
Mr. Smith in the following particulars:
A. The required payment of the funds within just a few hours. Mr. Smith and
I did not discuss the exact amount of time that would be needed, but I do not believe that a few
hours on the following day is a reasonable time.
B. There was no waiver or release of Western Rock by Tri-County discussed as
set forth in the proposed agreement.
C. We specifically discussed that Western Rock would use its best efforts to
aggressively collect from Precise. The agreement as submitted provides that Western Rock may
use whatever efforts it chooses, presumably including no efforts at all, to collect from Precise.
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11.

For these reasons, Tri-County elected not to sign the agreement submitted by

Western Rock, and we believe at this time there is no agreement in place between the parties.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this / /

day of April, 1996.

TERtfY WEA VER
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 1 ( ^ day of April, 1996.
Notarial Seal
Sandra L. Lentz, Notary Public
Bethel Tyvp., Lebanon County
My Commission Expires Aug. 24,1998

'^^JK

NOTARY PUBLIC

Member, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the /*)

day of April, 1996, a true and correct copy of the

within and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY WEAVER was mailed, first-class postage
prepaid, to the following:
Terry L. Wade, Esq.
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart
P.O. Box 400
St. George, Utah 84771
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Cw^RNEMEtfT SYSTEM3 INC.

608 E. EVERGREEN RD.
LEBANON, RA 17042
PH. 717-274-3488
FAX: 717-274-0781
MEMO
DATE:

November 11995

TO:

Western Back

ATTN:

Wayne Smith

FROM:

Terry L Wearer

SUBJECT:

Escrow Account

As per oar conversation yesterday i am confirming oar understanding concerning Tri
County posting security for the account of Precise Concrete^ This is a good faith effort to
prevent a Kenfrombeing filed on the property of Circle Four Farms* We understand that
you want to move promptly and will expedite apon conditions below.
ESCROW CONDITIONS
1. Tri County agrees to escrow S18S317-26 in interest baring account witfa Western
legal counsel
2. Western agrees to suppiy Ken wmivers for same upon receipt of escrow funds
ESCROW RELEASE CONDITIONS
1. Western shall use its best effort to collect moneys owed and resolve differences
with Precise. If this cannot be accomplished in a 6 month period Western has the
right to draw on escrow for principle amount with out tnterest.
2. Tri County receives interest on escrow funds.
GENERAL UNDERSTANDING
1. Western agrees to provide internal documents to Tri County regarding Precise
sccount tn order to assiit in concluding matter*.
2, Western conxsel will draw up escrow document A forward to Tri County.
Please correspond witfa Ron Soft if there are any questions and I am unavailable. I
understand thxt Bart Smith is your contact when you are not ISL
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Exhibit C

F IL $
APR 1 5 1996
THOMAS M. HIGBEE (1484)
HIGBEE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorney for Defendant
250 South Main Street
P. O. Box 726
Cedar City, Utah 84721
Telephone: (801) 586-4404

Cfe;

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WESTERN ROCK PRODUCTS
CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania
Corporation,

AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD SOLT

Plaintiff,
vs.
TRI-COUNTY CONFINEMENT
SYSTEMS, INC., a Pennsylvania
Corporation,

Civil No. »5-CV-115
Judge J. Philip Eves

Defendant.
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
COUNTY OF

)
: ss.
)

Ronald Solt, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1. This affiant is an individual residing in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. This affidavit is
made upon this affiant's own personal knowledge.
2. This affiant is the Chief Financial Officer of Tri-County Confinement Systems, Inc.,
a Pennsylvania corporation, doing business in Beaver County, Utah, and the Defendant herein.

n

3. On or about November 8, 1995,1 received a telephone call from Wayne Smith, from
Western Rock Products. I also received a fax transmission by which an escrow agreement and
a document entitled Agreement were submitted to Tri-County for signature. These documents
were submitted pursuant to discussions between Mr. Smith and Terry Weaver of Tri-County.
4. After reviewing the documents, Mr. Wayne Smith and I had a telephone conversation.
Mr. Smith was in Utah. I was in Pennsylvania. Mr. Smith advised me that unless Tri-County
signed the documents immediately, as drafted, Western Rock intended to file a mechanic's lien.
I expressed objection to this, stating that Tri-County needed time to consult with its attorneys
and to review the documents in detail. At the time I did not know the specifics of the terms
discussed between Mr. Weaver and Mr. Smith the day before.
5. Initially, Mr. Smith remained firm in his position that the documents had to be signed
and returned, and the funds paid, that day.
6. I contacted our attorney. Because he was in another meeting, I only had the chance
to talk to him briefly and he only had the opportunity to review the documents briefly.
7. After the discussions with our attorney, I again contacted Mr. Smith and explained
to him the objections which I had to the documents. Those objections included the following:
A. Tri-County objected to the release clause obtained in the documents.
B. Tri-County objected to the fact that Western Rock could unilaterally decide
what efforts, if any, it wanted to expend in pursuing Precise Concrete.
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C. We did not have sufficient time to review the agreement.
D. The agreement was couched in the terms of payment to Western Rock, rather
than as a reserve deposit.
E. The agreement eliminated the mutuality of performance.
8. Mr. Smith continued to insist that the funds had to be paid that day, and that the
documents had to be signed. I continued to insist that we would not sign the documents as
drafted.
9. As a matter of compromise, I agreed to pay the funds into escrow, and to sign the
escrow agreement with Southern Utah Title Company. As Mr. Smith and I discussed, this was
done as a show of good faith but was not intended to be a final agreement of the parties since
the terms of the agreement had not been reached.
10. I signed the escrow agreement, I deposited the funds by wire transfer, and I sent a
letter to Mr. Smith indicating that all of this was done pending finalizing the final terms of the
agreement. A copy of my letter to Mr. Smith is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated
herein by this reference.
11. Mr. Smith and I expressly discussed and agreed that this was not a final completed
agreement because of the unagreed terms.
12. There have been subsequent drafts of the agreement exchanged since then. At this
point, Tri-County does not desire to pursue negotiations or discussions further and believes that
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the negotiations are at an end without the completion of the contract and believes that the funds
should be returned to Tri-County.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this J^_

day of April, 1996.

^RONALDSOLT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this T ^
Notarial Seal
Sandra L Lentz, Notary Public
Bethel Twp , Lebanon County
My Commission Expires Aug 24 1998

e^-^^vx

<*LK ^

day of April, 1996.

OS - ^LP-WO^

NOTARY PUBLIC

Member, Pennsylvania Association of Notaries

o

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

day of April, 1996, a true and correct copy of the

within and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD SOLT was mailed, first-class postage
prepaid, to the following:
Terry L. Wade, Esq.
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart
P.O. Box 400
St. George, Utah 84771

Secretary
\TRI\SOLT AFF
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Exhibit D
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TRI-COUNTY

JFINEMENT SYSTEM9 INC.
608 £. EVERGREEN RD.
LEBANON, PA 17042
PH. 717-274-3488
FAX: 717-274-3781
MEMO

DATE:

November 71995

TO:

Western Rock

ATTN:

Wayne Smith

FROM:

Terry L Wearer

SUBJECT:

Escrow Account

Ai per oar cocversatioo yesterday i an confirming our understanding concarning Tri
County posting security for the account of Precise Concrete This ii a good faith effort ta
prevent a Ken from being filed on the property of Circle Foor Farms. We understand that
you want to nova promptly and will expedite apon conditions below.
ESCROW CONDITIONS
1. Tri County agrees to escrow S185317.26 in iaterest baring account with Western
legal counsel
2. Western agrees to luppiy Ken waivers for same upon receipt of escrow funds
ESCROW RELEASE CONDITIONS
1»Western shall use its beat effort to collect moneys owed and reseive differences
with Precise. If this cannot be accomplished in a 6 month period Western has the
right to draw on escrow for principle amount with out interest.
2. Tri County receive* interest on escrow foods.
GENERAL UNDERSTANDING
1»Western agrees to provide internal documents to Tri County regarding Precise
account in order ro assist in concluding matters.
2, Western couxsei will draw up escrow document A forward to Tri Couacy.
Please correspond with Ron Soft if there are any questions and I am unavailable. I
understand that Bart Smith is your contact when you are not in-
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THI8 AGREEMENT entered thi* 6th day gf November, 18QSI by and between
WKTCTN

Row FBOOgcm CORPORATION (hereinafter 'Western Rock") and TRI-COUNTY

CONTt««Kt 8YBrayBi, Iwa (hereinafter TrHCounty1}.
ftectfALfi
WHERIAS, TH-Oouhty It me general contractor gn a pro}** located near
MflfortS, Utah, tn Beaver County ooneMng of the conetrvetlon of Improvement to bo
uaed In conjynotfen with i hog farming operation (hereinafter tha MHofl Fami Project4);
WHEREAS, tno Hog Farm Project is ownnd by Clrole Four Realty, a db* of
Carroifa Poodt of UT, Inc., West late Partners, Inc.. Prwiafle Farms of Utah, inc.. and
3mfcMWd of Utah, Ino. (hereinafter 'Circle Four);
WHEREAS, Preoiee Concrete, Ino. (hereinafter •preoico Concrete") waa a
subcontractor of Trf-County on the Hog Farm Project
WHEREAS, Weetem Rook eupplled labor, ttcwcca and material* to the Hog
Farm Project at the re<fUeet of Precis Concrete end pursuant (0 an open credit
account maintained by foe latter (hereinafter the *Pr*ds* Account0):
WHEREAS, Pfeciae Concrete i& delfnquent In M payment obligation* to
Western Rock under the Preciee Account fof Vie eefd labor, aervfcea and material*
auppiied by Waetota Rock to the Hoe Farm Project;
WHEREAS, Western RocK haa made demand upon Pmciae Concrete for
payment of auma owed, but Prodeo Goncrat* haa follod to satiety M W demand;
WHEREAS, Woetom Rook hw notlltod Cimia Four and Trl-County of Preoiee
Concrete1* default in ita payment obilgationa to Wert em Rook;
WHEREAS, W««tem Rock haa further notified Trt-Counly and Circle Four of
Weatam Rootfe Intention to fife a mechanic^ Hon upon tho Hog Farm Prolooti
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WHEABA8, Circle Four and Tri-County wish to avoid ths filing of a mechanic's
lien upon the Hog Farm Project;
WHEREAS, TftCounty ctetoe to satisfy the Precise Account indebtedness and
thus eroki thefllrrgand enforcement of a mechanic's lion upon said Project;
NOW THEREFORE, in ooneiderrtion of the mutual promisee And obligation* set
forth herein, me parti** heretoflorae«a follows:
1.

Trt-Oounty ehallj>ey Weeiem Hock the cum of f 186,317.26 in full

satisfaction end settlement of tumgjnved to_We^em Rock by Precis* Concrete upon
the Proofs* AoooUnt 1or labor, eeiViOM and materials supplied by Western Rode to the
Hog Faro Project, The payment of this sum ehoH be made as follow*:
a.

On or before Ave o'clock P.M.. on November 8. 1095, Tri-

County shell cause to bo deposited In an interest bearing escrow
account (mom futty described hereafter) the said sum of $185,3*7.26
(hereinafter 'Settlement Funds') in lawful money of the United states of
America, negotiable and payable without defalcation or discount.
b.

The Settlement Funds shall remain in the escrow account

for a period of Si* month*, which period shall expire at five o'olook P.M.,
oil May 8.1096, after which time the Sstttamertt Funds end sny accrued
Interest thereon, ehefl be disbursed by the escrow agont, without further
svthofixstlen from the pertiee, as follows:
(1).

Western Rock shall recofve the sum of

*1K,317Jtf; and
(2)

Tri-County shell receive a sum consisting of

the tmereet Which has accrued upon the Settlement Funds
white fn the eepow account.
c.

,h is expreeely understood that performance by the ©*crorw

agent of its duty to make the disbursements described Above Is
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conditioned only and exclusively upon the expiration ol Ihe abnnonth
period. There chaf) be no other eooditione ralallnfl to disbumemfrt from
••Crow.

2.

An Eaorew Aooount shell be eetaMahed at 8ouinem Utah TMo Compmny

in St. George, Utah, in accordance with Escrow Instructions in the form attached hereto
as Exhibit A. The Settlement FUnda depoeitod Into e*c*ow ehaii bo placed by the
escrow agent In a standard Interest bearing money market account At Sun Capital
Bank boated in St George, Utah, at 60 South 100 East, St. George, Utah.
S,

Upon reeolpt of the Settlement Fund* (to-wh: $185,317.26) from the

eeorow. afomdeecrfbedi Western Rock waives and releases all rights to mechanic's
liens, contract or other daims. Q»sppU5hjcUImflL^s Western Rock may have again*
Precke Concrete, whfah now exist or which may hereafter anae for labor, eervlods, or
materials fumlehed on or before the 7th day of September, 1905, a! the request of
Precise Concrete and upon the Predee Accountforthe improvements associated with
the Hog Fa™ Project
ft Is understood and agreed that this watar is limited to those sums owed to
Western Rock fortabor.Mn/cac and nuiwmla provided to Pmcke Concrete urttttt th©
Precise Account, and does not extend to any tabor, sconce* or materials supplied by
Weetem Rook to anyono ebe tt any othor time for Improvement* upon the Hog Farm
Project.
4,

Wostam Rook ehsJl attempt 10 coUoct the Precise Account indebtedness

from Precise Concrete. Western Rock's efforts to do so shall be solely and exdualvety
determined and Qowftmtd by Western Rock's own diaomtlon, Aooerdingty. Wostorn
Rock ehelf not bo required to pursue judicial action, nor form*! proceedings of arty
kind; but rethor, may choote to merely conduct Internal ntegotiadgne In ita attempt to
oollfc* the Indebtedness. In eum, the often* to be made and/or moihoda to ba um*d by
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We«tom Rock in thk regard ahall be tho aole and ©wluaJve prerogative of Western
Bode
In tho « w t that Weeiem Rode roooevrw a payment of some portion or all of me
PreeJee Aooount indebtedness (eubjod hereof) from Preci*» Concrete neroaner,
Weetem Rock w i forward any such funde to Tr^County,
3.

Tri-Cwnty oxpraaaly ecknowledgee that Precise Concrete may aGGert

that the eume olafrned due by Western Rock on tho Precise Account are Incorrect or
inaccurate, or.that (he labor, aetvicee or metadata, or aomo portion thereof, eupplied by
Weetem Rook worn defective. Notwtthetandlng any cuch assertion, and whether It be
proven oooumta or not, Trt-County hereby watvea any claims! rfghta, dofenaea, or
caueaa of action It may haw to reduce, offsat or be reimbursed for the Settlement
Fuhdt being paid by TTVCocmty pursuant to thla Agreomont.
6.

in the event a dispute arise* over the term* of this Agreement, the

prevailing party, ahafl be entitk>d to any coats Incurred In the enforcement hereof, aa
weH aa a reasonable attorney1* fee.
7.

Thiii Agreement may be plead .aa a full and complete defer*? to, and

may be uaed ao the baala tor an Injunction agalnat any action, suit or other proceeding
Which may be instituted, pnwoouted or attempted In breech hereof,
6.

. It te expresaty understood and agreed that no promla**, warranties,

reproeentationa, or other understanding* have boon marin, other than thoai whfcfc are
axpraealy contained or referred to horaln, and that the terms of this Agreement are
contractual and not a mure recital.
0.

Thlt Agraamont may bo executed in aovanai counterpane and by

fectmifle ooplea, oecb of-which ahall &e an origin*] and ail of which togother shall
constitute one Instrument
10.

The undortfgtod partiee further state that tho foregoing Agreement has

boon read oanpfully and the oontanti thereof known end understood, and that thie
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documont, M eignod, ia an tot of fie« will, with me imtntion to be legally bound
thereby.
WESTER ROOK PRODUCTS
OQRPORATION
CTSOORPORATIOf

•.<&Jftfc" ._
UWHnrN6Y.Piifi«i

TRI-COUNTY CONFINEMENT BYSl
STEMS, INO.

STATE OF ITTAH
COUNTY Of WASHINGTON

IBS.
)

On fhle ft^ day of
floVPuh*^
. 1995, before mo personally
appeared OARRai WHITNEY, whose Identity U personally known to or provedtorne on
the besfe of sctfafactory evidence, and who, being by me duly sworn (or affirmed), dki
say thai he i« I M president at WESTERN ROOK PRODUCTS CORPORATION, & corporation,
and that fro foregolnfl document w(ti signed by him on behalf of that corporation by
authority of its bylaw* or o f t resolution of flc board of directors, and he acknowledged
before me that the corporation executed the document and the document wat the act
of the oorpowrtign for its elated purpose

ifc

R

MM ULi
PUBLIC

JgTAtYfWJC
§20 Nam 10*0 £Ml

Address: ,&%?>? *&&&

•

BTATCOFPENNSfYLVANIA
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,yjt,

n

RB^rmVfT|4?7Q
A ^ M I ? * . t«6

QO,

COUNTY OF.
. 1995, before me pcreonolty
On thle
day of
,
whom*
ttfe'ttfty
la p*rton«J(y known to or
appeared
proved to.mo on the baala of aetnfadofy evidence, and *ho. being by me duly twom
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(or affirmod), dfd «dy thct h« *4 the prwktat of TW-CGUNTY CONFINEMENT SYfiTTMS.
INC., « corporation, tnd thtft the foregoing dooament waa aignod by him on bohalf of
that cocpofttfart by cuthorfiy of Hi bylaw* or ol A rstolatton ot its board of dimaton*. and
he acknowtodfcpd baton mo that the corporation fxtcutod the documom and tho
documom wa*tfwtact of th# corporation forfoittatod purpow.
kjTARYPLBUC
Afldfita:
.
My OommlMton E » k * r . _ .
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November 8, 1&6S
SOUTHCTN UTAH Tim* COMPANY

St, Qaoqga. Utah M77Q
R&

Escrow Instruction* for Settlement Transaction between Waatorn Rock
Product* Corpondon and TrKfcunty Confinement Syotome, Inc.

Qentfemem
You amrequestedto eat at eeorow agent to handle tfw transaction outlined *in
this latter. Your ftaa ahall ba paid at outlined In the** instructions *nd the
accompanying document*. Any quaetteni mty be dlreotad to Teny L Wade at 6281611.
Operative D*CUm«ht for Settlement Transaction
You ara dettvend harawtth the oparattva document outlining the nature and
form of tha transaction oonaiBting of an Agreement between Western Rock Products
Corporation ("Western Rock1} pnd Trl-County Confinsment Systems, rno. (TrlOounty*}, dated November 8,1 wS, oonakSnfl of sk pages of text and three pages of
exhibits, namely these Escra* Inobuctionc (Exhibit A). P U n nivfew thk document
eansfully In order that you fttty be familiar with the transaction.
Funda To B t Deposited
You W8t reoeive funda from TrkCounty in tha amount Q\ 51R5.317.26. Theaa
funds (hereafter 'Sodlement Fund*') will be aent by TrnCounty on November 8,1W5.
via wire transrrieeiort to Sun Capital Bank ('Sun Capfta!*) A] its branch ottloa located at
AO fiouth 100 East, QL George, Utah, the Settlement Funds chall be payable to
Southern Utah Title Company In kn oapaotty as Escrow Agent You ara instructed to
obtain from Sun Capital a cashier's check In tha amount of the Settlement Funds and
to deposit tha said cashiAt'e eheofc In a standard Interest bearing money market
account f Eseraw Account*) at Sun Capital. The name of the account chall be Tr>County Confinement System*, Inc. and Western Rock Products Corporation in trust by
Southern Utah Title Company4
Diabwaament instrurtons
. The Settlement Funds We to remain In the Escrow Account for a period of six
months, whkh period shall expire at five o'clock P.M<, on May 8.1696. Immediately
following tho enrimgeA of ex* said aix-monm parted, you are instructed to dicbure* the
Battlement F U M A . toQaftw with ooeruad fntarost th«r*on. as follow*:

(1)

Western Rook ahall receive the sum of $185,31726; and

EXHIBIT
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P*0eStaf3

(2)
Tri-Coanty ihaJi mceto a aum oonatettog at tha interest
which has accrued upon the Settlement Fund* white in the Escmw
Account.
The dlabursament, etoredeecribed. shell be performed^ automatically, following
the expiration of the abt-month period, without any further notice or authorization from
Weatam Rock or TrKfojrty, or from anyone elae. There ahall be no other condhiona
relating to or In any way Governing or affecting diebureemont. except only the
oaplraoon of the eaid mx-morrth period.
General Terete
The fee* to aet up and' administer tho Eecrow Account aheJI be $1*0.00. and
ehjui be pekf by Trt^ounty to Southern Utah TWe Company.
In the avent a dfeputa should eriee ae between Western Rock and Tri»County
with raapect to thle Escrow Account, the aaid partiea agree to hold Southern Utah r.ne
Company harmleet from and against any liability or expense resulting to the latter aa
the raeuit of eucti dttpute, Including the ptyment of a raaaonable attorneys foe and
OOSQL

tthould any pvtv detautt In eny of the covenant* or agreementi herein
contained, that defaulting party Shall pay all costo and exponeea, Including a
reaeonebfe attoma/a fee, which may eriee or accrue from enforcing the terme of the^e
Eecrow Instructions, whether auch enforcement Is punmed byfiKngauit or otter*!?*.
Thaae Eeofow Inatrwrttona may be amandod only In writing signed by the
peitiaa to thts later.
TWe Agreement mey be executed In aevaral counterparts and by fectimile
copies, each of which shall be an original and al of Which bother ehai constitute one
instrument.
If 1he foregoing comxrfly eeta fonn your understanding of our agreement for you
to act * * Eeorow Agent, pieea* execute the cnotoaed copy of this letter In the apace
Invested below.
W E S T C W ROOK PRODUCTS oonpofunoN

Tfii-Couwnr CONFWEMWT StarcMa. INC.

By ±h^///S

By., -—„

UlLLt^

DAWttELL WHfTNCY, Prwid^t
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Sorutboro Utah Tulo Cvinnuny
Navtnnbor 8. 1905
Pa|p3of3

Accepted by Eicm* A6«* thk fth dty of November. IfiQSr
S4Uth*ni Utah TMt Company

TOW****
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WWLM*%2®)WWWW
CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS INC.
608 E. EVERGREEN RD.
LEBANON, PA 17042
PH, 717-274-3488
FAX: 717-274-3781

November 8,1995

Mr. Wayne Smith
Western Rock Products Corporation
820 North 1080 East
St. George, Utah 84770

Dear Wayne:

Confirming our conversation of today, I have executed a wire transfer to Southern Utah Title
Company, through Sun Capital Bank. I have also returned to you via fax the escrow instructions
pending finalization of the original agreement.
1 will forward a copy of the proposed changes as soon as I have them worked out.
Sincerely,

Ron Solt

EXHIBS
S W I N E , POULTRY, A N D L I V E S T O C K E Q U I P M E N T
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